Panel 1B: Liberalism and Justice -- Friday, 17 October 2003, 1-3 p.m.
Chair: Jeffrey Polet, Political Science, Malone College
Discussant: Peter Stone, Political Science, Stanford University
Abstracts:
David Thunder, “An Argument Against Rawlsian Public Reason from Agent
Integrity”
As John Rawls himself candidly notes, between 'A Theory of Justice' in 1971 and 'Political Liberalism' in 1995, a major shift occurred in his preferred strategy for defending liberal political institutions: his earlier defense of liberalism, in 'A Theory of Justice' (1972) underestimated the sorts of deep-rooted philosophical and religious differences that characterize the citizenry of contemporary liberal democracies, and are likely to do so indefinitely under conditions of free inquiry. According to the Rawls of 'Political Liberalism', the political scheme advanced in 'A Theory of Justice' was based on a comprehensive doctrine of liberalism from which citizens espousing alternative (reasonable) comprehensive doctrines could reasonably dissent. For this reason, the Rawls of 'Political Liberalism' argued that we ought to advance a public justification of liberalism that is purely political or freestanding.
While Rawls's shift from philosophical to political liberalism has come under much critical fire, I believe that one negative consequence of political liberalism has not been sufficiently exposed, namely, its tendency to generate a moral schism within the identity of those citizens who attempt to, or feel pulled by the duty to, bracket their so-called comprehensive doctrines when they engage in certain kinds of public, politically relevant acts. Drawing on the concept of integrity as developed by thinkers such as Joseph Raz, Ronald Dworkin, and Bernard Williams, this paper sets out to show how the moral requirements of Rawlsian reasonableness inexorably give rise to a split within the self among those who feel obliged to adhere to it. Unlike many critics (e.g. Phil Quinn, Paul Weithman, Nicholas Wolterstorff) who focus almost exclusively on the epistemological burdens imposed upon religious believers by political liberalism, I will draw attention to significant epistemological burdens arising out of Rawls's theory for liberal/secular and religious citizens alike. Although Rawls does not explicitly acknowledge this problem with his theory, there are tensions within political liberalism, e.g. between the notion of an overlapping consensus and the ideal of stability for the right reasons, which he seems reluctant to resolve, and it can be plausibly argued that one reason Rawls failed to resolve these tensions is that any candid attempt to do so would either affirm moral integrity at the cost of political liberalism or affirm political liberalism at the cost of moral integrity, either of which would force Rawls at a minimum to radically recast the project of political liberalism, one of whose goals is undoubtedly to help people lead meaningful and fulfilled moral lives within a large modern polity. If my argument is correct, then central features of political liberalism constitute a serious and probably indefeasible impediment to truly meaningful, integrated moral agency.
Brad Roth, “Rethinking the Rights vs. Sovereignty Opposition: The Moral
Significance of Collective Decisions”
The variant of liberal
theory predominant in the contemporary human rights movement, in homage to the
dignity of the human person qua rational end-chooser, confines the mission of
the state to neutral pursuits that do not prejudge the conception of good life
that each individual may adopt. This theoretical tendency enables universal
rights to be asserted without deference to the decisions of particular political
communities about the nature of the good society wherein the good life is
pursued. Such an approach tends to underestimate the sweep of the compulsory
collective decisions by which societies create the preconditions to
substantively meaningful choice.
If rights are universal, rather than the product of a decision at a particular
time and place, and if the good life is peculiarly a matter of individual
prerogative, the project of the state cannot properly be accorded an independent
moral significance, nor can the positive law that derives from that project. In
denying that political struggle legitimately sets the effective terms of the
right and the good within a given state, the currently ascendant brand of
liberalism sets the stage for an extraordinary disrespect for the internal
processes of collectivities hitherto considered to have the right to
self-determination.
The breadth of the potential implications is obscured by the present focus on
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other mass atrocities, toward
which moral revulsion is nearly universal in an empirical sense (even in the
absence of a shared theoretical framework). As the focus shifts to more
distinctively liberal rights claims, however, disrespect for non-conforming
conceptions of public order may tend to license, in the name of implementing
universal norms, highly troubling exertions of power across borders.
Gregory Streich, “Justice Beyond Just Us: Negotiating Time, Place, and Race”
Theories of justice often focus on the procedures governing political decisions and the substantive results of those decisions. In both types of theorizing, the concern is mainly on the fairness of the procedures or decision at the current historical moment for the individuals and groups in question. I am guided by three practical concerns, that prompt us to re-examine theories of justice: Can we get people to think about how their decisions affect future generations? Can we get citizens to think about justice for citizens of other countries? Can we get people to think about justice for others who are not like them in terms of race, religion, sexual identity, and other differences of identity? Whether the answers are yes or no, theories of justice must investigate ways to think about these issues.
In this paper, I suggest that this focus needs to be supplemented by considering time, place, and race. In other words, theories of justice must be pushed to account for three additional factors. First, there is a temporality issue (i.e., is the focus only on justice right now, or on justice across time?) I argue that we supplement our focus on the contemporary moment with more attention on inter-generational justice. Second, there is a political unit issue (i.e., is the focus only on states or nation-states, or on trans-national and global levels of analysis?). I argue that we must supplement our focus on nation-states with more attention to trans-national and global concerns. And third, there is an in-group/out-group issue (e.g., is the focus on justice for the group or community, or on cross-group issues of justice?). I argue that we must address justice within and between groups.
Of course, theorists have provided some answers. Pericles asked that citizens
make decisions as fathers to ensure they thought of future generations. Alexis
de Tocqueville admired self-interest properly understood in which citizens
realized that their own well-being was connected with the well-being of each
other. Cosmopolitan theorists such as Martha Nussbaum ask us to consider
ourselves citizens of the world not just of nations. Such themes are important
for my argument since they all prompt individuals to think beyond ones self-,
group-, or nation-interest
as primary.
In this paper, I will reflect on how theories of justice address issues of time,
place, and race. I want to sketch out the contours of a theory of justice that
moves beyond the contemporary, beyond the self, and beyond the group and
supplements and adds modifiers such as inter- and
trans-. Since the world is increasingly inter-connected, theories of justice
must address such concerns even while some political actors still assert the
concerns of self over other and national over global.