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April 6-8, 2006
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April 6-8, 2006
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From Section I
Paul D’Ambrosio
“The universe is a finger, all things are a horse” A Daoist Critique of the Primacy of Aristotle’s Principle of Non-Contradiction
Merrimack College (North Andover, MA)The dialogue between Western and Eastern philosophies is a valuable excursion into understanding that the two strains of thought often complement each other. Studying ideas from both Eastern and Western thought allows one to view different perspectives on old paradigms and problems. Combining ideas from opposite sides of the world can help scholars to grasp ideas that they might not have otherwise imagined. Daoism, in particular, offers a unique perspective on some of the oldest and most widely accepted Western principles. A wonderful example of Daoism’s original approach to Western paradigms can be seen when one contrasts Aristotle’s primacy of the principle of non-contradiction with Daoist philosophy, and especially in the Zhuangzi.
The nature of the arguments that Aristotle uses to support his principle of non-contradiction are unyielding. However, Aristotle did qualify his arguments when he stated that this principle could be denied if all things are viewed as one, a central idea in Daoism. Aristotle did not anticipate that anyone would actually take the position that all things are one, and for this reason he did not try to defend the principle beyond this point. Aristotle relies on his arguments against those who deny the principle of non-contradiction, as well as his indirect proofs, to show that even arguing against the principle forces its acceptance
Aaron Creller
Lao Tzu and Heraclitus and a Transcendent Ethic
Central Michigan University (Mt Pleasant, MI)
Comparing the thoughts of two different cultures’ ancient thinkers gives an opportunity to find portions of both cultures’ ideas that hold true in today’s time. Using a specific example, the variety of interpretations possible in examining Heraclitus and Lao-Tzu allows for it to be done from various perspectives. By using the original works and a selection of philosophical articles discussing the fragments of Heraclitus and the Tao Te Ching, a comparison involving these two authors reveals suggestions for a common ethical system. The ethic suggested involves four common factors that can be drawn out of both works. Firstly, that living a good life involves interacting with a part of reality (the Tao for the Lao Tzu and the Logos for Heraclitus) that is both immanent and pervasive. Secondly, this aspect of reality is part of what constitutes a soul. Thirdly, interaction with this element of reality also involves both rationality and detachment from preconceived perspectives and knowledge. Finally, this sort of interaction is something that is possible even from a young age and can be seen in children, especially detachment from perspectives and from knowledge that can result in dogmatic habits.
From Session IIa
Tom Mangione
“A Good Conversation”: Plato’s Symposium, Nietzsche and a Philosophical Eros
George Mason University (Fairfax, Virginia)While it may be a sad truth that today those engaging in philosophy are often on the defensive when attempting to justify their own discipline outside the ‘ivory tower,’ this paper hopes to make a defense by exploring the question as to the purpose (telos) of philosophy from the point of view of desire (Eros). In order to accomplish this task, I have engaged in a comparison of Plato’s Symposium with several works from Nietzsche’s corpus to search for a philosophical Eros, and subsequently, to reveal a number of purposes for the discipline, specifically: creativity, vindication of the arts, self-affirmation, creative self-affirmation and critical self-affirmation. In addition to providing such conclusions, the paper also hopes to illustrate strong links between Plato and Nietzsche, two philosophers often seen as diametrically opposed. The hope is that these juxtapositions will allow for future juxtapositions between these two philosophers to prove more fruitful in their resonance.
Gavin Fee
The Human Situation
State University of New York at Oneonta (Oneonta, NY)Abstract: In this thesis I submit that the Human race remains tethered to an outdated system of information by examining Human nature and social necessity. Mythology, religion and dogma still pervade society and government in every walk of life, much to the detriment of progress. Since we have moved into a modern digital era wherein information is abundantly available, the need to update the information that influences the formation of social dispositions is greater than ever. I propose that we recognize this adherence to fictions and ascend into a form of education which is authoritatively established by what I am tentatively calling the International Academic Community. Proceeding to establish information qua knowledge, the IAC will set up internationally cooperative programs of education which focus on sound academic endeavors, replacing programs which become biased in respective societies.
From Section IIb
Qi Lu
Traditional Chinese Symbols of Reproduction as Reflected in Excerpts of Lao Tzu’s Writings
Eastern Connecticut State University (Willimantic, CT)By examining several excerpts from Lao Tzu’s writing, this paper compares the literal, pictographic meaning of Chinese characters to the English translation in an effort to highlight how the original text relies on traditional Chinese symbols of reproduction. Out of Lao Tzu’s use of Chinese characters for female body parts and ancient religious patterns based on fish, mice and plants, this paper shows how Taoist philosophy posits a feminine creative force and presence as the source of being. Through an examination of several characters and their usage in excerpted passages, this paper argues that Lao Tzu’s philosophy organically emerged from ancient Chinese religious practices and patterns of expression.
Philip Walsh
Dogen’s Genjo Koan: Full of Deficiency, Deficient of Fullness
Villanova University (Villanova, PA)The tenants of Zen have been expressed throughout the ages in a multitude of forms. Koans, philosophical writings, verbal teachings, and silent actions have all accounted for the universal and particular nature of Zen. This paper intends to examine the writing of one of Zen’s foremost thinkers and writers, Dōgen Kigen. Dōgen’s Genjōkōan, a fascicle of his magnum opus Shōbōgenzō, is considered one of the preeminent texts of Japanese Zen, as it clearly and poetically states the most profound truths of Zen, while simultaneously indicating the necessity to remain unattached to these truths. This paper focuses on the linguistic elements of Genjōkōan, placing them in the context of phenomenology, but does not explicitly make any comparisons or cross-cultural studies. The conclusion reached at the end of this paper is not conclusive in the traditional philosophical sense, but allows for a simultaneously ethical, ontological, and phenomenological understanding of Genjōkōan.
From Session IIIa
Jared Van Vranken
Eternal Recurrence
SUNY College at Fredonia (Fredonia, NY)Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence is best viewed as a psychological test. Eternal Recurrence is intended to weed out higher types from lower types of human beings. Nietzsche believed that all higher types would affirm Eternal Recurrence and all lower types would reject it. Although Nietzsche endorsed Eternal Recurrence whole heartedly, it is not without its many problems. As a psychological test it fails because: it is conceivable that higher types could reject it and lower types could accept it and it fails to account for various interpretations that one can make of it. Higher types could reject the doctrine because it homogenizes their lives (because their lives would occur an infinite number of times) when they are trying to create a unique self (recognizing multiple perspectives apart from the herd of man). Lower types and Last Men, could very well affirm Eternal Recurrence. Their lives are the epitome of ease and comfort, so to live again and again would not be horrible at all. In addition if a lower type person is an atheist, Eternal Recurrence would be even easier to affirm because the choice between nothingness and living again is quite simple. There are multiple interpretations or perspectives that one can deduce from Eternal Recurrence. This is a problem for Nietzsche because one could deny Eternal Recurrence or claim it has no bearing on their life, regardless of whether or not they were a higher or lower type. On a different note, Eternal Recurrence does ask us to examine our lives which requires reflection and solitude, two items that are sorely lacking in today’s society
Jeremy Forster
The Nietzschean Free-Spirit and Falsification
Brown University (Providence, RI)Nietzsche’s philosophy is fraught with hard to grasp concepts and interpretive complexities, made only more difficult by Nietzsche’s unique but occasionally disorganized writing style. Perhaps the most confusing of Nietzsche’s tendencies is his ostensible proclivity to self-contradiction. Generally passed off as just a facet of Nietzsche’s style, some of Nietzsche’s glaring and potentially detrimental contradictions often go unanalyzed. One such contradiction seems to exist with respect to Nietzsche’s account of falsification and its relation to the free-spirit. He not only asserts that falsification is part and parcel of our acts of understanding and perception, but endorses a kind of falsification as one of the defining characteristics of the free-spirit. More perplexing, however, are his criticisms of Christianity and other similar worldviews for employing what seems like the same falsification he extols. This paper aims at clearly articulating the resulting contradictions, and hopes to offer a close reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy in an attempt to resolve and undo this alleged quandary.
From Section IIIb
Nathan Matusick
Fear and Trembling From God in Politics
Corning Community CollegeReligious-minded political activism has become prevalent in the United States of America in recent years. Although America has had to grapple with the role of religion in government throughout its history, its official dissociation with any religious belief structure has allowed religion to flourish in the U.S. in contrast to its comparative downturn in Northern Europe. There may be reason to believe that an infusion of religion in government would compromise the comparative vigor that our religious institutions in the U.S. now enjoy. Contrary to the goal of religious activists, the conflation of religious and political doctrine may do more to harm the religious spirit of the United States. This is not only observed in practice (in Europe), but predicted in Western thought most notably by the 19th century Danish philosopher and social critic Soren Kierkegaard.
Although Kierkegaard’s thought in itself is apolitical, it captures an essential concern relevant to this political debate.
Kierkegaard’s concern for the individual’s religious authenticity is reflected in his emphasis on responsibility. Such responsibility stems from the inward reflection required of a genuine choice, and the unique leap of faith required by religion. These concerns are relevant to our own time and represent a unique perspective on the political issue of church and state. Most modern arguments for the separation of church and state focus on the liberal dictates of a pluralistic society, but Kierkegaard brings to focus the negative possibilities a movement away from separation of church and state may have for the religious individual.
The subjective focus of Kierkegaard’s philosophy cannot help one deal most effectively in a society where political participation is vital. The problems of a politically liberal, morally pluralistic society remain. Religiously devoted individuals need to still be able to help decide the fate of the country without compromising the authenticity of their religion. John Rawls’s ideas of political liberalism and his notion of “public reason” allow for this to occur. Rawls’s concerns conveniently pick up where Kierkegaard leaves off. Where Kierkegaard abandons reason with an individual’s leap of faith, Rawls embraces reason as a tool to reach political consensus overlapping all different religious beliefs. Together, they can be used to argue more effectively for the separation of church and state.
The religious in this country who may find it difficult to achieve true faith can take advantage of the synthesis of the ideas of Kierkegaard and Rawls. In Kierkegaard, they can have the promise to be guided to a very individual, serious, and meaningful leap of faith into religion. With Rawls they can preserve the authenticity of faith and still be productive members that their liberal political system asks of them.
Patrick J. Connolly
Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf
Georgetown University (Washington, DC)Traces the historical development of early modern natural law theory by explicating prominent works of Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf. Specifically examines the grounding provided for the theories: sociability in Grotius, self-interest in Hobbes and a synthesis of these two in Pufendorf. This synthesis is seen as an advance in natural law. Also discusses the role religion plays in the three theories as an explanation for Pufendorf’s popularity.
From Session IVa
Michael Hicks
Mereological Co-Location and Limited Discourse
Virginia Commonwealth University (Richmond, VA)In this paper, I will examine an intuitive set of claims regarding the ontology of physical objects, explain why they are generally thought to conflict, and then present two accounts of our intuitions regarding these claims. I will argue against these accounts, and I will then argue that accepting the mereological co-location of distinct objects is the best way to coherently account for the majority of these intuitions. I will use a familiar example, namely, that of Allan Gibbard’s statue and lump, Goliath and Lumpl.
Chris Biermann
Epistemicism: Optimum Solution to Sorites
Dartmouth College (Hanover, NH)Vagueness arises in almost every area of language, and following right behind is the Sorites Paradox. Rather than attack the argument's validity or accept its conclusion as is, though, the best way to settle this paradox seems to be to deny its main premise: i.e. 'If n grains of sand is a heap, then n+1 grains of sand is a heap.' There are two conventional ways of doing this-supervaluationism and epistemicism-but after the downfalls of supervaluationism are exposed and the virtues of epistemicism established, the less popular epistemicism will prove to be the best candidate to resolve Sorites.
Enoch Lambert
Hacking and Human Kinds
Cornell University (Ithaca, NY)Ian Hacking (see especially 1986; 1991; 1995a, 2002) says that human kinds are different from natural kinds. What kind of a claim is this? What kind of import is it meant to have? Is it a metaphysically innocent claim comparable to ones stating that biological kinds are different from chemical kinds which are different from sub-atomic kinds, etc. (assuming, for our purposes, the metaphysical innocence of these claims)? Is it a metaphysically forceful claim—one stating that human kinds differ from natural kinds in some essential respect? Or, is it somewhere in between—one implying that, though there may not be any “deep” metaphysical difference between human and natural kinds (e.g., that humans are somehow radically non-natural), theoretical inquiry into human kinds must nevertheless function in some strikingly different ways and with different results from all other kinds of natural theoretical inquiry?
In this paper I would like to further develop and defend some of the lines of reasoning that lead Hacking to the positions he takes. Specifically, I will defend the thesis that human kinds differ from other natural kinds in an ontologically significant sense by arguing that the epistemology, semantics, and ethics of human kinds feed back on to and change their ontology in a way unlike other natural kinds. Developing and extending Hacking’s use of the existentialist tradition in his account of human kinds, I will argue that existential meaning is one of the primary mediating factors in this kind of feedback. Using existentialist insights into identity and action, I will also more fully develop Hacking’s use of the idea of spaces of possibilities for action in a way that makes it less reliant on Anscombe’s work on intentional action and so less open to criticism due to Anscombe exegesis.
From IVb:
Whitney Trettien
Kant’s Invention of Autonomy: Misconstruing Evil and the Individual
University of Maryland (College Park, MD)Kant’s radical conception of autonomy lays a foundation for the misconception of evil by 1) problematically linking rationality with moral autonomy and 2) constructing an ethical system inherent in the individual that, promoting a form of ethical minimalism, ignores the importance of empathy and personal connections in composing an ethical character. Beginning from the premise that we must qualitatively redefine evil as secular and adjectival, I first explore Kant’s conception of autonomy, offering several objections and ways in which it may implicitly lead to the promotion of an evil character. Then I will discuss how Kant’s invention of an ethical system inherent in the individual has led to a crisis of ethical minimalism. Finally, I suggest that we can escape this ethical dilemma by reestablishing a sense of community through connections with the Other, as outlined in Immanual Levinas’ philosophy.
Waylon M. Bryson
The Fetus is Trapped in a Metaphysical No-Man’s-Land!-A Continental Philosopher’s Approach to Abortion
Washington State University (Pullman, Washington)My paper outlines a perspective and methodology for philosophical inquiry and then applies it to the issue of abortion. Specifically, Mary Anne Warren’s personhood argument and Don Marquis’s potentiality argument are phenomenologically critiqued and then synthesized to form a new conception of the human entity. The fetus is evaluated within this new conception. This allows for a refinement of Judith Jarvis Thompson’s autonomy argument, and ultimately leads to the conclusion that abortion is justified to the point of viability at which time it becomes morally problematic. In conclusion, I return to the methodology working in my paper, and I suggest the outlined system’s theoretical promise for other issues in biomedical ethics.
Phillipp Rabovsky
God and Morals
SUNY Potsdam (Postdam, NY)Argues that God, and the prospect of eternal reward or damnation, presents an ulterior motive when acting ethically, and that the only way one can be moral is in a world absent of objective values. Only by acting on subjective values can we be moral.
From Session Va
Evan Anhorn
Heidegger and Nihilism: In Response to the Criticism of Hans Jonas
Connecticut College (New London, CT)In all the criticism of Heidegger, the strongest concerns often came from his students. One of the most interesting is Hans Jonas, who was inspired, by the many flaws of Heidegger’s imperfect work, into fashioning his own philosophy. Jonas’ naturalistic approach to Being and ethics is intentionally far removed from, and at odds with, the very personal Dasein that Heidegger described in Being and Time. By attempting to rediscover an objective truth based in nature, Jonas hoped to overcome what he saw as a strong, if unacknowledged, nihilistic and existentialist trend within Heidegger’s thought. Jonas’ main argument tries to exploit the inconsistencies of existentialism, but it fails to lend him the proof he needs. Jonas' critique does, however, offer valuable lessons for reconsidering the nature of truth in the face of subjectivity. Because any understanding of truth, care, or meaning in nature relies on "looking upon nature" from our perspective, we cannot remove the element of our subjective position. When we look, we discern many conditions that are backed by both our subjective experiences and by logic. The greater these conditions are supported by experience and reason, the greater weight of significance they carry in our lives. Because of this, we can find a new form of "objective" truth, a truth that is objective for our world, through a unique human expression which, within the context of this world in which we dwell, is sensible. It is the human formulation of a truth that is, in its own way, objectively true (in speaking to the human impression of nature), but at the same time, is necessarily not authored by nature itself.
Timothy Jussaume
A Heideggerian Approach to Religion
College of the Holy Cross (Worcester, MA)In this essay, I examine the relationship between religion and truth using Heidegger’s philosophy to guide the course of the discussion. Initially, the question concerning the relationship between religion and truth is framed in terms of a choice – how does the believer choose one religious perspective over another? If religion requires faith that is not empirically or logically verifiable, how does one determine which religious perspective is the most “truthful”? Using Heidegger’s On the Essence of Truth, I work to show that these kinds of questions are based on a misunderstanding of the way we, as human beings, relate to the “truth”. For Heidegger, “truth” is never something that can be selected, but rather, is something that is assigned to us with a “binding directedness”. With this insight, I attempt in my essay to suggest an alternative to the everyday notion of religion as a choosing of one perspective from among an array of equally available options.
From Section Vb
Nathaniel Brown
“Scaling Back our Significance: A Proposition to Justify Prudential Concern”
Union College (Schenectady, NY)Many philosophers of personal identity hail Derek Parfit’s seminal work, Reasons and Persons to be eminent in the realm of personal identity theory. While the influence and reach of Reasons and Persons is undeniable, several claims in it remain controversial. Among them is Parfit’s response to the objection of the extreme claim, the argument that Reductionism makes it impossible for us to hold others accountable, for us to feel pride about past deeds, and especially for us to have prudential concern for our future “selves”. In short, the extreme claim makes a justification for egoistic concern necessary if one wishes to remain a Reductionist.
Mark Siderits offers his own justification for egoistic concern in face of the extreme claim. In his work, Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Personstity and Buddhist Philosophy, Siderits argues from a consequentialist platform. Yet his proposed justification raises issues of its own. The goal of this essay is thus twofold: to refute Siderits’ argument for the justification of egoistic concern, and to propose an entirely different, yet sensible and intuitive justification for egoistic concern in the wake of Reductionism.
Ashley J. Inglehart
The Incompatibility of Parfitian Survival and Parfitian Morality
Virginia Commonwealth University (Richmond, VA)Abstract: In his book, Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit states that personal identity should be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity and connectedness. Since each of these can clearly come in degrees, he thinks that facts about personal identity are also matters of degree which consist of the holding of specified facts.
In the first part of this paper, I will discuss the Parfitian conditions for survival. I will then expain Parfit’s views of morality in relation to his views on personal identity. Certain moral notions such as entitlement, commitment and desert are also a matter of degree. I will then argue that Parfitian survival is incompatible with Parfit’s moral claims in relation to personal identity given our intuitions of notions like desert.
From Section VIa
Justin Brozanski
On Epistemological Absence and the Aim of Science
Flagler CollegeRecently, in response to Ernan McMullin, Bas van Fraasen defends a modified version of his Constructive Empiricism (CE). Van Fraasen agrees that modified CE is “indeed set squarely within a common sense realism that was foreign to much of the empiricist tradition.” Modified CE need not lead one to scientific realism for this account does not require epistemic commitments. Additionally, van Fraasen agrees with McMullin in what is at issue between realists and empiricists is not epistemological, but ontological. However, van Fraasen does not see why this metaphysical commitment necessarily leads to scientific realism. If accepted, van Fraasen’s modified CE can act as a viable alternative answer to scientific realism when considering the question “What is Science?” With this in mind, I do not think van Fraasen’s modified CE speaks directly to this ontological question, “What is Science?” nor is able to coherently explain itself through the values it advocates on the grounds of sponsoring an independency toward epistemological commitments. Thus, I argue that a philosophy describing the aims of science cannot and ought not to act independent of traditional epistemology.
Jama Oliver
The Coherence Theory of Knowledge: A Brief Overview and Answers to Objections
East Tennessee State University (Johnson City, TN)Abstract: The Coherence Theory of knowledge is an attempt to solve the epistemic regress that occurs when one attempts, using a foundationalist theory of epistemology, to provide justification for a claim. A theory advocated by Lawrence BonJour, Coherentism is a system of empirical justification in which each belief is justified and accepted based on how well it fits with other beliefs already present within the system. I present an overview of Coherence Theory and then discuss and provide answers to the most common objections to the theory.
From Section VIb
Shanna Hollich
Is Determinism Really As Deterministic As We Have Determined It to Be?
Brandeis University (Waltham, MA)Abstract: The story is often seen as cut-and-dried – Newtonian mechanics provides definitive evidence for determinism, and quantum mechanics provides equally definitive evidence for indeterminism. Therefore, when modern physics largely abandoned Newtonian mechanics in favor of quantum theory, philosophers should have likewise abandoned determinism in favor of indeterminism. However, research has shown that this distinction may not be as clear as was once believed. Newtonian mechanics may not bind us the way that we think, and quantum mechanics may indeed not leave us free.
Phillip John Torres
On the Genealogy of Technology
University of Maryland (College Park, MD)For more than two and a half billion years, hominids—beginning with australopithecines in the Pliocene epoch and culminating with modern Homo sapiens sapiens—have creatively modified the environment for their own ends. But what exactly are these ends? Have they changed through time? In other words: are the ends of human beings today different from those of our hominid ancestors? Pertinent to this are questions concerning human motivation, and the various prerequisites for technological innovation. To answer these I will introduce a central theoretical distinction between
(1) Technology that serves to assuage some immediate physiological-safety need arising either from within the organism, such as the need for food and hydration, or from the external natural environment, such as the need for protection from harsh weather and predators, and (2) Technology that serves to correct some “secondary” problem arising from the very use of technology. The essay concludes by examining the implications of this distinction, and whether the process of technologization is teleological in the sense of moving us closer to, and eventually meeting, the forward-looking goal of “happiness,” or an “easy life.”
From Session VIIa
Jake Feldman
Analysis of Concrete Relations with Others as Found in No Exit
SUNY Potsdam (Postdam, NY)The present paper investigates the concepts and philosophical ideas associated with Jean-Paul Sartre’s doctrine pertaining to man’s concrete relations with others, as found in his book Being and Nothingness. Our attitudes towards others are then argued to have been demonstrated by Sartre in his dramatic work No Exit.
Jonathan Gingerich
The Progressive Possibilities of Love
Georgetown University (Washington, DC)In this paper I examine Sartre's description of love in Being and Nothingness and the potential response offered by the phenomena of forgiveness. Sartre argues that love is triply destructible because (1) the more that I love the more I lose my existence as a free individual (2) lovers can always cease to love at any moment and (3) the presence of people outside of a lover-beloved dyad makes love relative. Sartre argues that because love is destructible it cannot provide a sufficient basis for relations with other people. I argue that the attitude of forgiveness, which is contained within the attitude of love, allows love to be made sustainable.
Dunstan McNutt
A Prisoner’s Tale, with an Introduction
East Tennessee State University (Johnson City, TN)The following essay and accompanying short story make an attempt at showing the distinction between Kierkegaardian notions of resignation and faith. The short story involves two characters who represent these two notions. The protagonist of the story, the prisoner, has allowed himself to become what Soren Kierkegaard called the Knight of Infinite Resignation. The new cell mate is represents the Knight of Faith. The knights come to their titles by the similar routes, but where one becomes mired in this own imagination, the other transcends; leaping from resignation to faith. It is my claim that if one falls into resignation, infinitely, they will be unable to leap to faith.
From Section VIIb
Joshua Earlenbaugh
Systematic Function and Heuristic: A Synthetic Methodology
University of Missouri – Kansas CityBiologists are constantly using teleological, or even more simply functional, language. When a biologist remarks that the function of the heart is to pump blood, and not to, say, make noise, they are singling out one effect among many and designating this privileged effect as the function of the feature in question. As functional talk seems to be acceptable when speaking with a biological context, the question arises as to exactly how this language can be justified. The etiological approach to functional denotation dominates the current literature, but its indelible historical nature can be problematic when assessing the function of vestigial organs – such as the wing of an ostrich. This paper will examine the etiologist’s position in light of G. Schlosser’s systematic definition of functionality, ultimately arguing that utilizing the latter helps alleviate key problems when applying the former. Moreover, this discussion will evaluate the pragmatic approach of V. Hardcastle, and although reject it as an empirically revealing definition in itself, I will argue that her denotation should be regarded heuristically in conjunction with Schlosser’s definition. This union then yields a unique, synthetic, and empirically revealing methodology for approaching teleology in a natural context.
Karl Mill
Information Processing and Consciousness
Marist College (Poughkeepsie, NY)This paper is an examination of the issue of "Strong A.I", that is, the claim that the human mind is analagous to a computer program. Through a brief examination of some of the history of the philosophy of the mind that led up to the debate, the paper focuses on a comparison between Alan Turing and John Searle. The argument is made that the human mind is something fundamentally different from a computer program and that it is possible to make this distinction without succumbing to some of the problems that plague dualism and other non-reductive views. Although it is not the intention of this paper to settle on a theory of consciousness as the correct one, it is this paper's intention to show that drawing a line between man and technology is more than just the result of sentimental attachment.
Emilio Reyes Le Blanc
Dismantling Drestke: a Sellarsian theory of change blindness
University of Toronto (Trononto, Canada)Our visual systems give us the impression that the world we inhabit is rich with detail, and occupied by a multifarious variety of things. But is our perceptual experience similarly detailed? Recent psychological evidence suggests not. Change blindness studies show us that people withperfectly functioning visual systems can fail to report differences between two successively presented visual stimuli, even when those stimuli are presented almost instantaneously after one another. This is a surprising result, since these differences are usually quite salient. If everything in those arrays appeared to us with equal detail, then it seems our fine-grained perception of them would be sufficient to report a difference. But we do not report one. So how are we to explain this? This essay has two goals. The first is to dismantle a recent philosophical account of change blindness by Fred Dretske. I argue that his argument fails because it falls prey to the Myth of the Given. After clearing the way, I develop a new theory of change blindness—one rooted in the thought of Wilfrid Sellars. The theory I devise combines two key Sellarsian theses—psychological nominalism and verbal behaviourism—with the attentional explanations of change blindness proffered by cognitive psychologists. My conclusion is that the inability to report a difference needs to be explained in terms of the inability to attend to (and, hence, perceive) that difference.
From Part Session VIII
Stefan Livingstone Shirley
Strait Jackets, Blinders, and What are we really arguing about anyway?
College/University: SUNY-OneontaIn this paper I ask a lot of rhetorical questions. That’s so my fellow common man reading it will think I’m smart. Scholars of philosophy like myself ask a lot of questions that they don’t know the answers to hoping no one will call our bluff. Drawing my examples mostly from criticism and analysis of Mark Twain’s A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court I question whether or not our scientists, doctors, and professors are really thinking critically. I question the meaning and significance of believing only one interpretation of something is necessarily correct. I question what I perceive as an increasing, unpleasant, and inappropriate tunnel vision in academia today. In short, I call their bluff.
Joshua Wolak
Autochthony: Heidegger, Meta-Philosophy and Meditation
Belmont University(Nashville, TN)In the Discourse on Thinking, Martin Heidegger attempts to describe why autochthony, which can be understood as a sort of “rootedness,” is essential for the progress and well-being of the individual and society. The philosopher also claims that autochthony is a mystical sort of state that must be psychologically unconcealed, and that this unconcealment can only come about by way of meditative (as opposed to traditional or calculative) reasoning. While Heidegger’s ideas in this text may be of great value, they are, as can be expected of the philosopher, muddled and unnecessarily complicated. In order to clarify Heidegger’s thought, my essay expounds on the concept of autochthony as understood by the philosopher, and also in mythological and contemporary psychological contexts. Most importantly, the essay considers what effects that the unconcealment of autochthony would have on the discipline of philosophy as a whole. It concludes by positing meditative thought as meta-philosophical solution to the sorts of trivial problems that arise when the discipline of philosophy is myopically confined to trivial calculative reasoning.
Brooke Rudow
Awe: A Philosophical Analysis of an Amazing Emotion
University of HawaiiAwe is a multidimensional emotion. It can become colored and more specific with a mixture of almost any other emotion. However, inherent within the emotion, when taken at its most basic level, is a conflicting aspect of positive and negative. One can feel extreme pleasure from the beauty of standing near the edge of a cliff that plunges into the ocean. Yet, pain also arises from the possibility of devastation which could be caused by it. Both of these feelings are wrapped up and captured by one emotion: awe. It is exhilarating, and people tend seek out awe inspiring objects. However, people often report fear mixed with awe. Awe startles and takes one aback. It only lasts a moment but has the ability to change lives. Very few emotions hold this significant clash of pleasure and pain, yet awe is often neglected in studies of emotion. In this paper I would like to take a intense look at the deeply interesting and profound emotion of awe.
Website constructed and maintained by Douglas Shrader / Department Chair Philosc@Oneonta.edu 
March 3, 2005
Updated April 7, 2005
